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In hybrid public key encryption (PKE), first a key encapsulationmechanism (KEM) is used to
fix a random session key that is then fed into a highly efficient data encapsulation mecha-
nism (DEM) to encrypt the actual message. A well-known composition theorem states that
if both the KEM and the DEM have a high enough level of security (i.e. security against
chosen-ciphertext attacks), then so does the hybrid PKE scheme. It is not known if these
strong security requirements on the KEM and DEM are also necessary, nor if such general
composition theorems exist for weaker levels of security.
Using six different security notions for KEMs, 10 for DEMs, and six for PKE schemes, we
completely characterize in thisworkwhich combinations lead to a securehybrid PKE scheme
(by proving a composition theorem) and which do not (by providing counterexamples).
Furthermore, as an independent result, we revisit and extend prior work on the relations
among security notions for KEMs and DEMs.
© 2010 Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
Public key encryption (PKE) schemes (in contrast to symmetric ones) usually have restricted message spaces, meaning
that each ciphertext can hide only a limited number of plaintext bits. This greatly limits their application since in practice
one typically wants to efficiently encrypt arbitrary amounts of data. One way of solving this problem is by using a hybrid
encryption scheme consisting of an (asymmetric) public-key part to encrypt a key plus a (symmetric) secret-key part to
encrypt the actual data. For the first part one uses a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) to produce a random symmetric
key K together with a ciphertext. For the second part this symmetric key K is then used to encrypt the data using a highly
efficient data encapsulation mechanism (DEM), such as one based on AES. This popular approach is often referred to as the
“KEM/DEM paradigm" and was first formalized by Cramer and Shoup [11,28].
This KEM/DEM paradigm is a simple way of constructing efficient and practical public key encryption schemes, and
so has received a lot of attention in the literature. It is incorporated in many new standards and recommendations for
encryption (see [12,25,29], for example) andmanyKEMshavebeenproposed in the literature ([8,11,13,21,27,28]andothers).
A natural question when dealing with this paradigm is how the security of the individual KEM and DEM parts relates to the
security of the resulting hybrid public key encryption scheme. This question is quite broad since there are a lot of different
security notions for the three components of the paradigm to consider. As an example, the strongest security notion one
usually considers is denoted as indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) [26]. Cramer and Shoup [11]
already proved that chosen-ciphertext security for the KEM and the DEM part is a sufficient condition to obtain a chosen-
ciphertext secure hybrid PKE scheme. The first natural question is if one can relax the general security requirementsmade to
the KEM or DEM part and nevertheless obtain a chosen-ciphertext secure hybrid PKE scheme. This question is in particular
motivated by the hybrid encryption scheme by Kurosawa and Desmedt [1,23] which is chosen-ciphertext secure as a hybrid
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PKE scheme whereas its KEM part alone was shown not to be chosen-ciphertext secure [10]. A more general problem is to
study which of the standard/natural security levels of the KEM and DEM parts are enough, and which are not, to obtain a
secure hybrid PKE scheme.
1.1. Overview of our main contributions
The main result of this paper is to solve the above open problem. We study the conditions that the KEM and the DEM
must satisfy in order to lead to a secure hybrid PKE scheme. Our characterization is complete with respect to the considered
security notions for KEMs, DEMs, and PKE schemes (that will be introduced in the next subsection) and the hierarchies
implied by these notions. 1 For fixed security levels of the KEM and the DEM we show which security level for the hybrid
PKE scheme can be guaranteed (by proving a corresponding hybrid composition theorem) and which cannot (by presenting
a concrete counterexample).
To prove our results, we can in some places make use of established techniques [3,17], whereas in other cases we need
to introduce new proof machinery.
1.2. Security notions for KEMs, DEMs, and PKE schemes
PKE security notions. For PKE schemeswe consider the six standard notions of {NM, IND}-{CPA, CCA1, CCA2}whichwere
classified in [3].
KEM security notions. For KEMs, besides the straightforward indistinguishability based security notions, we consider the
notion of non-malleability (NM) that was proposed in a paper by Nagao et al. [24]. Our six considered notions for KEMs are
therefore
{NM, IND} − {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}.
The relations between the above notions are the same as in the PKE case (with similar proofs to those in [3]).
DEM security notions. For DEMswe consider the standard notions of {NM, IND}-{CPA, CCA1, CCA2}. Furthermore, we add
the twoattack formsofone-time (OT)andone-timechosen-ciphertext (OTCCA) security.Adding thesenewnotions (thatorig-
inate fromCramer and Shoup [11] and do not give an adversary access to an encryption oracle), whichwewill see later, ismo-
tivated by the hybrid PKE approach. The 10 considered notions forDEMs are thus {NM, IND}-{OT,OTCCA, CPA, CCA1, CCA2}.
Compared to [17] we use a different (and in our opinionmore natural) security definition of NM for DEMs. (We do so to avoid
intuitively completely insecure schemeswhich are still non-malleable, see Section 2.3 for a discussion.) As a consequence,we
obtain a DEM hierarchy (Fig. 3 in Section 2.3) that is very different from that established in [17]. In fact, the characterization
of the relations among the {CPA, CCA1, CCA2} notions is exactly the same as for the PKE case established in [3]. We think
that this new characterization may be of independent interest.
Why consider non-malleability?While considering IND type security notions for KEMs, DEMs, and PKE schemes is straight-
forward, it may seem less interesting to consider NM type security notions for them. For the case of PKE and DEMwe refer to
[3,5,14] and [17] for a motivation. We now motivate NM security for KEMs. First of all, it is a natural theoretical question in
the hybrid setting whether it is possible to build NM hybrid encryption from NM KEMs and DEMs. It is known that NM-CPA
secure PKE schemes are easier to construct than IND-CCA2 secure ones [9] so in the hybrid settingwe can also hope to be able
to construct more efficient NM-CPA secure KEMs. Furthermore, and maybe more interestingly, non-malleability for KEMs
also seems to be a natural security notion when considering so called related-key attacks [6,22] on DEMs. In related-key
attacks, a DEM is attacked by observing encryptions under “meaningfully related keys" and in the past many popular cryp-
tographic ciphers were successfully broken by such attacks (e.g., [7,19,20]). For hybrid encryption, NM security for KEMs
exactly prevents such related-key attacks on the DEM part.
1.3. (In)Sufficient conditions for hybrid encryption
We show in Fig. 1 which conditions on the KEM and the DEM lead to a hybrid PKE schemewith a certain level of security,
and which do not. The symbol “≥” is used for positive implications, meaning that any combination of a KEM and a DEM
with the stated levels of security leads to a hybrid PKE scheme with the level of security stated after the symbol “≥”. On the
other hand, the symbol “<” is used for negative results, meaning that there exists some combination of a KEM and a DEM
satisfying the stated security notions such that the resulting hybrid PKE scheme does not satisfy the security notion stated
after the symbol “<”. (Usually, these constructions will require some mild complexity assumptions, e.g., the existence of a
secure KEM in the first place.)
In the table there are eight key results, those with a number attached in brackets, which refers to the theorem where
we prove the corresponding result. We deduce the rest of our results from these by using the security hierarchies of KEMs,
DEMs, and PKE schemes, that is, the relations between the different security notions for each of these primitives (that are
1 We do consider established security notions for KEMs, DEMs, and PKE schemes such as those from [3]. We do not consider, in particular, the notion of
IND-CCCA [16], which is tailored towards achieving secure hybrid encryption with one specific type of construction.
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Fig. 1. Sufficient and necessary conditions for hybrid encryption. The results are given in set-notation: all positive results holdwith respect to theweakest possible
combination of KEM/DEM in the set, whereas negative results hold with respect to the strongest combination. For discussion on how the key results propagate
in this diagram, consult the discussion in the text and Figs. 2 and 3.
Fig. 2. Implications and separations between security notions for PKE schemes from [3]. Note that these implications also hold for the corresponding KEM security
notions.
Fig. 3. Implications and separations between the security notions for DEMs.
summarized in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively). Here positive results propagate to the right and down, whereas negative results
propagate to the top and left.
We now turn to a discussion of our results from Fig. 1. The first remarkable fact is that it is possible to group notions for
DEMs that achieve the same security level for the resulting hybrid scheme, even though the primitives themselves can be
separated. For example, with an IND-OT secure DEM one can always reach the same level of security as with an IND-CCA1
DEM.
Extending [11], ourmainpositive result is that anX-Y secureKEM in combinationwith anX-Y secureDEMalso yields anX-
Y secure hybrid scheme (Theorems 3.1–3.3). Furthermore, an IND-CCA1 KEM and an IND-OTDEM already yield an IND-CCA1
hybrid scheme (Theorem 3.1); a NM-CCA1 KEM plus a NM-OT DEM imply a NM-CCA1 hybrid scheme (Theorem 3.2).
Our table also shows that the sufficient conditions on the KEM and the DEM in the composition theorem from [11] are
also necessary: an IND-CCA2 secure hybrid scheme can only be guaranteed if both the KEM and the DEM have the highest
considered security levels (that is, IND-CCA2 for KEM and IND-{OTCCA, CCA2} for DEM). Any attempt to weaken the KEM to
IND-CCA1/NM-CCA1 or the DEM to NM-CCA1may yield a hybrid PKE scheme that is no longer IND-CCA2 (Theorems 4.1/4.5
and Theorem 4.4, respectively). Furthermore, even the strongest possible KEM in combination with a weak DEM (or vice-
versa) only provides a relatively weak hybrid PKE scheme (Theorems 4.3 and 4.2). We stress that our negative results also
hold in combination with DEM ciphertext integrity INT-CTXT [4,18]. Note that IND-CCA2 plus INT-CTXT (also denoted as
authenticated encryption) is strictly stronger than IND-CCA2 [4].
Our characterization from Fig. 1 is complete with respect to all standard security notions for KEM, DEM, and PKE. We
stress, on the other hand, that different, less standard security notions for KEMs/DEMs can lead to interesting results. For
instance, [16] considers a new security notion for KEMs called “constrained chosen-ciphertext (IND-CCCA) security.” IND-
CCCA security is a proper relaxation of IND-CCA2 security for KEMs. However, [16] proves that, when combined with a
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suitably secure DEM, it allows to construct fully IND-CCA2 secure PKE schemes. This paper only considers more established
security notions such as CPA, CCA1, and CCA2 security.
For proving our results, we use new as well as established techniques: for instance, the proof of Theorem 4.3 basically
transports a counterexample used in [3] to separate two security notions for public key encryption to the hybrid setting.
Conversely, Theorems 4.2 and 4.5 use a newDEMmodificationwhich introduces new, “weak” DEM keys. This does not harm
the stand-alone security of the DEM in any way, but only makes sense in our specific KEM/DEM setting where the DEM keys
produced by the KEMmay be “vulnerable”.
2. Security definitions
In this section we formally introduce different security notions from PKE schemes, KEMs, and DEMs.
We first need to introduce some common notation. If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length, while if S is a finite set then
|S| denotes its size. If k ∈ N then 1k denotes the string of k ones. We write X||Y to denote an encoding of two strings X and
Y that allows to uniquely recover both X and Y . If S is a set then s
$← S denotes the operation of picking an element s of S
uniformly at random. We write A(x, y, . . .) to indicate that A is an algorithm with inputs x, y, . . . and by z $← A(x, y, . . .)
we denote the operation of running A with inputs (x, y, . . .) and letting z be the output. We write AO1,O2,...(x, y, . . .) to
indicate that A is an algorithm with inputs x, y, . . . and access to oracles O1,O2, . . . and by z
$← AO1,O2,...(x, y, . . .) we
denote the operation of running Awith inputs (x, y, . . .) and access to oracles O1,O2, . . ., and letting z be the output.
2.1. Public key encryption
PKEschemes.Apublic keyencryption (PKE) schemePKE = (PKE.Kg,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec)consistsof threeprobabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms. For consistency, we require2 that for all k ∈ N, all keypairs (pk, sk) in the range of
PKE.Kg(1k), and all messagesm ∈ {0, 1}∗, we always have PKE.Dec(sk,PKE.Enc(pk,m)) = m.
PKE indistinguishability. For atk ∈ {cpa, cca1, cca2}, the notion of indistinguishable against ATK attacks (IND-ATK) is
captured by defining the advantage of a PPT adversary F = (F1,F2) as
Adv
pke-ind-atk
PKE,F (k) =
∣∣∣Pr
[
Exp
pke-ind-atk-1
PKE,F (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exp
pke-ind-atk-0
PKE,F (k) = 1
]∣∣∣,
where, for b ∈ {0, 1},
Experiment Exp
pke-ind-atk-b
PKE,F (k)
(pk, sk)
$← PKE.Kg(1k); (St,m0,m1) $← FDEC1(sk,·)1 (pk), s.t. |m0| = |m1|;
C∗ $← PKE.Enc(pk,mb); b′ $← FDEC2(sk,·)2 (C∗, St); return b′
and the oracles DEC1 and DEC2 are defined as
atk DEC1(sk, ·) DEC2(sk, ·)
cpa ε ε
cca1 PKE.Dec(sk, ·) ε
cca2 PKE.Dec(sk, ·) PKE.Dec(sk, ·)
with the restriction that F2 is not allowed to query oracle DEC2(sk, ·) on the target ciphertext C∗. Here ε denotes an oracle
which returns an empty string for any input. Note that we use both capital and lower case letters for the same concepts (like
atk, cpa, . . .), depending on the expressions, so to improve their readability.
We also require that F1 outputs two messagesm0 andm1 of equal length. This can be enforced, e.g., by only allowing F1
that always output equal-length messages; equivalently, we can truncatem0 andm1 to min{|m0|, |m1|} bits.
A public key encryption schemePKE is said to be indistinguishable against ATK attacks (IND-ATK) if the advantage function
Adv
pke-ind-atk
PKE,F (k) is a negligible function in k for all polynomial-time adversaries F . Recall that a function f (k) is negligible in
k if there exists k0 ∈ N and c > 0 such that f (k) < 1/kc for all k ≥ k0.
Vector notation. In the following, we will denote vectors in boldface, as in C. We denote by |C| the number of compo-
nents in C, and by C[i] the ith component, such that C = (C[1], . . . , C[|C|]). We stress that in particular we also con-
sider the empty vector. We write C = ε if |C| = 0. We use the natural notation C ∈ C to indicate C = C[i] for some
1 ≤ i ≤ |C|. It will also be convenient to extend decryption to vectors where the operation is performed componentwise,
2 Some relaxations are possible, see [15, Comments after Definition 5.1.1], for example. Such relaxations do not affect our results.
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namely by M = (M[1], . . . ,M[|C|]) ← PKE.Dec(sk, C) we mean that M[i] ← PKE.Dec(sk, C[i]) for 1 ≤ i ≤ |C|.
We will consider relations of arity t, where t will be polynomial in the security parameter k. By writing R(M,M) we mean
R(M,M[1], . . . ,M[t − 1]).
Formalization of non-malleability. Non-malleability was introduced in [14] and subsequently refined [3,15]. The goal of
an adversary in a non-malleability experiment is, given a ciphertext C, to come up with a vector of ciphertexts C whose
decryption M is meaningfully related to m, where m is the plaintext encrypted in C. Here meaningfully related means that
R(M,M) holds for some relation R. The question is how one can exactly measure the advantage of an adversary. We will use
the definition from [3] which considers an experiment involving the adversary.
For atk ∈ {cpa, cca1, cca2}, the notion of non-malleable against ATK attacks (NM-ATK) is captured by defining the advan-
tage function of a PPT adversary F = (F1,F2) as
Adv
pke-nm-atk
PKE,F (k) =
∣∣∣Pr
[
Exp
pke-nm-atk-1
PKE,F (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exp
pke-nm-atk-0
PKE,F (k) = 1
]∣∣∣.
Here, for b ∈ {0, 1},
Experiment Exp
pke-nm-atk-b
PKE,F (k)
(pk, sk)
$← PKE.Kg(1k); (St,M) $← FDEC1(sk,·)1 (pk);
m∗0,m∗1
$← M; C∗ $← PKE.Enc(pk,m∗1);
(R, C)
$← FDEC2(sk,·)2 (C∗, St); M ← PKE.Dec(sk, C)
If C∗ ∈ C and R(m∗b ,M) then return 1 else return 0
and the oracles DEC1 and DEC2 are defined as above, again with the restriction that A2 is not allowed to query DEC2 for C∗.
In the experimentM is a probability distribution on the space of messages, and m $← M denotes the choice of a message
following this distribution. We insist thatM is valid; that is, |m0| = |m1| for anym0,m1 that are given non-zero probability
inM. (See also the discussion after our PKE indistinguishability definitions.)
The relations among all these different security notions for public key encryption schemes were established in [3]. They
are summarized in Fig. 2.
2.2. Public-key encapsulation mechanisms
Nowa public-key encapsulationmechanism (KEM)KEM = (KEM.Kg,KEM.Enc,KEM.Dec)with associated key-space
KeySp(k) (which we assume to be KeySp(k) = {0, 1}(k), where (k) is the key-length) consists of three PPT algorithms.
For consistency, we require that for all k ∈ N, and all (K, C) $← KEM.Enc(1k, pk)we have Pr [KEM.Dec(sk, C) = K ] = 1,
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk, sk)
$← KEM.Kg(1k), and the coins of all the algorithms in the
expression above.
KEM indistinguishability. The notion of indistinguishability of KEMs against CCA2 attacks was established in [11]. Using
the ideas from Section 2.1 it is straightforward to also extend it to CPA and CCA1 attacks.
For atk ∈ {cpa, cca1, cca2}, the notion of indistinguishable against ATK attacks (IND-ATK) is captured by defining the
advantage function of a PPT adversary A = (A1,A2) as
Advkem-ind-atkKEM,A (k) =
∣∣∣Pr
[
Expkem-ind-atk-1KEM,A (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expkem-ind-atk-0KEM,A (k) = 1
]∣∣∣,
where, for b ∈ {0, 1},
Experiment Expkem-ind-atk-bKEM,A (k)
(pk, sk)
$← KEM.Kg(1k); St $← ADEC1(sk,·)1 (pk);
K∗0
$← KeySp(k); (K∗1 , C∗) $← KEM.Enc(pk);
b′ $← ADEC2(sk,·)2 (pk, C∗, K∗b , St); return b′
with the restriction thatA is not allowed to query DEC2(sk, ·) on the target ciphertext C∗. Oracles DEC1 and DEC2 are defined
as in the case of PKE.
KEM non-malleability. In the PKE case, the adversary in the first stage has to output a description of themessage spaceM.
This models the situationwhere an adversarymay attack only a specific set of plaintexts such as the twomessages “yes” and
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“no”.With a KEM, the situation is different. A KEM is used to create ciphertexts for random keys, where the keys are uniformly
distributed over some fixed key-space (whose description is contained in the public key). In general there is no efficient way
to create a ciphertext for an arbitrary key. Therefore it is unreasonable to let the adversary define a key distribution K since
the challenger would not be able to efficiently sample pairs of keys and ciphertexts where the keys are drawn according
to K. We rather define K to be the sampling algorithm that returns a key uniformly distributed in the key-space, just as
KEM.Enc(pk) should do. We now give the formal definition of NM for KEMs as proposed by Nagao et al. [24].
For atk ∈ {cpa, cca1, cca2}, the notion of non-malleability against ATK attacks (NM-ATK) is captured by defining the
advantage function of a PPT adversary A = (A1,A2) as
Advkem-nm-atkKEM,A (k) =
∣∣∣Pr
[
Expkem-nm-atk-1KEM,A (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expkem-nm-atk-0KEM,A (k) = 1
]∣∣∣,
where, for b ∈ {0, 1},
Experiment Expkem-nm-atk-bKEM,A (k)
(pk, sk)
$← KEM.Kg(1k); St $← ADEC1(sk,·)1 (pk);
K∗0
$← KeySp(k); (K∗1 , C∗) $← KEM.Enc(pk); c $← {0, 1};
(R, C)
$← ADEC2(sk,·)2 (C∗, (K∗c , K∗1−c), St); K ← KEM.Dec(sk, C)
If C∗ ∈ C and R(K∗b ,K) then return 1 else return 0.
The relation between the security notions for KEMs is the same as in the PKE case (see Fig. 2). The equivalence between
IND-CCA2 and NM-CCA2 was shown in [24] and the rest of the relations can be proved with a similar reasoning than in the
PKE case studied in [3].
2.3. Data encapsulation mechanisms
A data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) DEM = (DEM.Kg,DEM.Enc,DEM.Dec) consists of three PPT algorithms.
We require that for all k ∈ N, and all messages m, we have Pr [DEM.Dec(K,DEM.Enc(K,m)) = m ] = 1, where the
probability is taken over the choice of K
$← DEM.Kg(1k), and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
DEM indistinguishability. It is well known how to define indistinguishability against CPA, CCA1, and CCA2 attacks for
DEMs [2].Weconsider twomoreattack formswhichwecall one-timeattacks (OT)andone-time (adaptive) chosen-ciphertext
attacks (OTCCA).
For atk ∈ {ot, otcca, cpa, cca1, cca2}, the notion indistinguishable against ATK attacks (IND-ATK) is captured by defining
the advantage function of a PPT adversary B = (B1, B2) as
Advdem-ind-atkDEM,B (k) =
∣∣∣Pr
[
Expdem-ind-atk-1DEM,B (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expdem-ind-atk-0DEM,B (k) = 1
]∣∣∣,
where, for b ∈ {0, 1},
Experiment Expdem-ind-atk-bDEM,B (k)
K
$← DEM.Kg(1k); (St,m0,m1) $← BENC(·),DEC1(sk,·)1 (1k), s.t. |m0| = |m1|;
C∗ $← DEM.Enc(K,mb); b′ $← BENC(·),DEC2(sk,·)2 (C∗, St); return b′
and the oracles ENC, DEC1, and DEC2 are defined as
ENC(·) DEC1(sk, ·) DEC2(sk, ·)
ot ε ε ε
otcca ε ε DEM.Dec(K, ·)
cpa DEM.Enc(K, ·) ε ε
cca1 DEM.Enc(K, ·) DEM.Dec(K, ·) ε
cca2 DEM.Enc(K, ·) DEM.Dec(K, ·) DEM.Dec(K, ·)
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with the restriction that B is not allowed to query the oracle DEC2(·) on the target ciphertext C∗. For clarification we note
that in [17] different notation is used for attack forms on DEMs: OT is P0-C0, CPA is P2-C0, CCA1 is P2-C1, and CCA2 is P2-C2,
whereas OTCCA was not considered.
DEM non-malleability. Let B = (B1, B2) be a PPT adversary. For ATK ∈ {ot, otcca, cpa, cca1, cca2}, the notion of non-
malleability against ATK attacks (NM-ATK) is captured by defining the advantage of B as
Advdem-nm-atkDEM,B (k) =
∣∣∣Pr
[
Expdem-nm-atk-1DEM,B (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expdem-nm-atk-0DEM,B (k) = 1
]∣∣∣,
where, for b ∈ {0, 1},
Experiment Expdem-nm-atk-bDEM,B (k)
K
$← DEM.Kg(1k); (St,M) $← BENC(·),DEC1(sk,·)1 (1k); m∗0,m∗1 $← M ;
C∗ $← DEM.Enc(K,m∗1); (R, C) $← BENC(·),DEC2(sk,·)2 (C∗, St);
M ← DEM.Dec(K, C)
If C∗ ∈ C and R(m∗b ,M) then return 1 else return 0
and the oracles ENC, DEC1, and DEC2 are defined as in the IND case.
Katz and Yung [17] already provide security definitions for {OT, CPA, CCA1, CCA2} attacks which we extend (motivated
by the KEM/DEM approach [11]) by adding OTCCA attacks. We stress that, in contrast to the original definition of Katz
and Yung [17], we allow invalid ciphertexts in C as well as an empty C. This leads to a relatively strict definition of non-
malleability, 3 butwe think that this best reflects the underlying intuition. It should not be possible to have a “secure” system
which is only secure because the adversary cannot comeupwith a valid encryption of anything. Consider, for instance, a DEM
which in every encryption leaks the complete plaintext, but authenticates every encryption so that no adversary can come
up with a valid ciphertext without knowing the secret key. This scheme is trivially secure with respect to a non-malleability
notion from [17] that requires the adversary to come up with a valid, non-empty ciphertext vector. (In fact, this is precisely
the example from [17, Proof of Theorem 7].) We believe that this “security” is intuitively not justified.
Relations. Fig. 3 shows the relations among the different security notions for DEMs. Due to our alternative security notion
of NM, the proofs from [3] relating {IND,NM}−{CPA, CCA1, CCA2} for PKE schemes carry over the DEM setting. 4 Therefore
the center diagram in Fig. 3 exactly coincides with the relations for PKE schemes and KEMs (Fig. 2).
The only thing that remains to prove is to extend a result from [3] showing that NM is strictly stronger than IND for all
attacks forms. For CCA2 attacks this is in contrast to [17] (recall that [17] uses a weaker notion of non-malleability).
Theorem 2.1 (NM-ATK⇒ IND-ATK). If a DEM is secure in the sense of NM-ATK then it is secure in the sense of IND-ATK, for any
ATK ∈ {OT,OTCCA, CPA, CCA1, CCA2}.
Proof. For ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2} this is essentially Theorem 3.1 from [3]. We focus on the case ATK ∈ {OT,OTCCA}.
Assume DEM is secure in the NM-ATK sense for ATK ∈ {OT,OTCCA}. We will show it is also secure in the sense of
IND-ATK. Let B = (B1, B2) be an IND-ATK adversary attacking DEM. We have to show that Advdem-ind-atkDEM,B (·) is negligible.
To this end we will describe a NM-ATK adversary A = (A1,A2) attackingDEM.
Alg. A1(1k)
(m0,m1, St)
$← B1(1k)
M ← {m0,m1}
Return (M, St,m0,m1)
Alg. ADEC2(sk,·)2 (C∗, St,m0,m1)
c
$← BDEC′2(sk,·)2 (m0,m1, C∗, St)
Define R(m0) := 1 − c, R(m1) := c
Return (C = ε, R)
In the OTCCA case, adversary B2 has access to an oracle DEC′2 which is simulated by A2 using its own oracle DEC2. Note that
A2 outputs an empty ciphertext vector C = ε.
It is easy to verify that adversary A perfectly simulates B’s view in the IND-ATK game. Furthermore, it holds
Pr
[
Expdem-nm-atk-1DEM,A (k) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expdem-ind-atk-bDEM,B (k) = b
]
.
In effect, by [3, Proposition 3.8] wemay assume here, without loss of generality, that we havem0 = m1 for the twomessages
output byB1. AdversaryA returns a relation R : {m0,m1} → {0, 1} such that R(m) = 1 ifm = mc and R(m) = 0, otherwise.
3 We remark that this stronger notion of non-malleability is already mentioned (but not used) in [17].
4 Concretely, for PKE schemes [3, Theorem 3.3] shows IND-OTCCA⇒ NM-OTCCA and IND-CCA2⇒ NM-CCA2; [3, Theorem 3.5] shows IND-CCA1 ⇒ NM-CPA;
[3, Theorem 3.7] shows NM-CCA1 ⇒ NM-CCA2; [3, Theorem 3.6] shows NM-CPA ⇒ IND-CCA1. All these results carry over to the DEM setting.
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In the IND-ATK game we have DEM.Dec(K, C∗) = mb and therefore by definition of R, we have R(mb) = 1 if and only if
b = c.
Finally, we have that Pr
[
Expdem-nm-atk-0DEM,A (k) = 1
]
= 1/2. This follows from an information theoretic argument since A
does not have any information about the message m˜ ∈ {m0,m1} in which the relation R is evaluated.
Applying the claims yields Advdem-ind-atkDEM,B (k) = 2 · Advdem-nm-atkDEM,A (k). Since DEM is secure in the sense of IND-ATK,
Advdem-nm-atkDEM,A (·) and hence Advdem-ind-atkDEM,B (k) is negligible, too. 
2.4. Hybrid encryption
LetKEM = (KEM.Kg,KEM.Enc,KEM.Dec)beapublic-keyencapsulationmechanism(KEM)andDEM = (DEM.Kg,
DEM.Enc,DEM.Dec) be a data encapsulationmechanism (DEM). For simplicitywe assume that the two schemes are com-
patible in the sense that for all security parameters k, we have that the KEM’s and the DEM’s key-space are equal. (If that
is not the case we can apply a suitable key-derivation function [11] that maps the KEM’s key-space to the DEM’s key-space.)
Then we can consider the hybrid public key encryption scheme PKEKEM,DEM = (PKE.Kg,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) which
is constructed by combining KEM andDEM as follows:
Alg. PKE.Kg(1k)
(pk, sk)
$← KEM.Kg(1k)
Return (pk, sk)
Alg. PKE.Enc(pk,M)
(K, C1)
$← KEM.Enc(pk)
C2
$← DEM.Enc(K,M)
Return (C1, C2)
Alg. PKE.Dec(sk, (C1, C2))
K
$← KEM.Dec(sk, C1)
M
$← DEM.Dec(K, C2)
ReturnM
3. Sufficient conditions for secure hybrid encryption
3.1. Claims
We state more formally the positive results summarized in Fig. 1 and provide proofs. The following three results
can be considered as the main composition theorems for hybrid encryption. They show that, for X ∈ {IND,NM} and
Y ∈ {OT,OTCCA, CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, an X-Y secure KEM and a X-Y secure DEM imply an X-Y secure hybrid PKE scheme.
Interestingly, in some cases we have that for the DEM part a weaker attack form than Y is already sufficient.
Theorem 3.1 (IND-ATK KEM + IND − ATK′ DEM ⇒ IND-ATK PKE). For ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, if KEM is a secure KEM
under IND-ATK attacks andDEM is a secure DEM under IND − ATK′ attacks, then PKEKEM,DEM is a secure PKE scheme under
IND-ATK attacks, where for ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1}, ATK′ = OT and for ATK = CCA2, ATK′ = OTCCA.
The CCA2 version of the proof can be found in Theorem 5 of [11]. The proofs for the other two cases are almost identical
and omitted here.
The following two results are proved in Section 3.2.
Theorem 3.2 (NM-CCA1 KEM + NM-OT DEM ⇒ NM-CCA1 PKE). If KEM is a secure KEM under NM-CCA1 attacks and DEM
is a secure DEM under NM-OT attacks, then PKEKEM,DEM is a secure PKE scheme under NM-CCA1 attacks.
Theorem 3.3 (NM-CPA KEM + NM-OT DEM ⇒ NM-CPA PKE). If KEM is a secure KEM under NM-CPA attacks and DEM is a
secure DEM under NM-OT attacks, then PKEKEM,DEM is a secure PKE scheme under NM-CPA attacks.
We remark that the reductions are tight; that is, adversarial advantage and running times are preserved during the
reduction.
3.2. Proof of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3
These theorems state that NM-CCA1 KEM + NM-OT DEM⇒NM-CCA1 PKE, and NM-CPA KEM + NM-OT DEM⇒NM-CPA
PKE. We will detail the first result, and will briefly comment the second result in the last paragraph of this section.
As a technical tool, we first provide an equivalent formulation of the NMnotion forKEMs. This notion of non-malleability
under parallel chosen-ciphertext attackswas introduced in [5] for the PKE setting, and extended to the KEM setting in [24].
For atk ∈ {cpa, cca1, cca2}, the notion of non-malleability under parallel ATK attacks (PNM-ATK) is captured by defining
the advantage function of a PPT adversary A = (A1,A2) as
Adv
kem-pnm-atk
KEM,A (k) =
∣∣∣Pr
[
Exp
kem-pnm-atk-1
KEM,A (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exp
kem-pnm-atk-0
KEM,A (k) = 1
]∣∣∣,
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where, for d ∈ {0, 1},
Experiment Exp
kem-pnm-atk-d
KEM,A (k)
(pk, sk)
$← KEM.Kg(1k); St1 $← ADEC1(sk,·)1 (pk);
K∗0
$← KeySp(k); (K∗1 , C∗) $← KEM.Enc(pk) ;K∗ ← K∗d ;
(St2, C)
$← ADEC2(sk,·)2 (C∗, K∗, St1); K $← KEM.Dec(C); d′ $← A3(K, St2)
If (C∗ ∈ C) then return d′ else return 0
and the oracles DEC1 and DEC2 are defined as in Section 2.1.
A key encapsulation mechanism KEM is said to be PNM against ATK attacks if the advantage function Advkem-pnm-atkKEM,A (k)
is a negligible function in k for all polynomial-time adversaries A.
It has been proved in [24] that (a slightly different but equivalent formulation of) PNM-ATK is tightly equivalent to NM-
ATK for ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}. In the following proof, we are going to use therefore the PNM notion instead of the
equivalent NM notion.
3.3. Proof of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3.
First, to prove Theorem 3.2, assume KEM to be NM-CCA1 secure (and thus PNM-CCA1 secure), and DEM to be NM-OT
secure. Consider an adversary F = (F1,F2) on the NM-CCA1 security of PKEKEM,DEM. Denote the NM-CCA1 experiment
Exp
pke-nm-atk-b
PKEKEM,DEM,F (k) by G
b
0.
InGb0, thechallengeciphertextC
∗ is generatedasC∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 ) for (K∗, C∗1 ) $← KEM.Enc(pk)andC∗2 $← DEM.Enc(K∗,
m∗1). In experiment Gb1, we modify the generation of the challenge ciphertext as follows: C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 ) for (K∗, C∗1 ) $←
KEM.Enc(pk) and C∗2
$← DEM.Enc(K−,m∗1) with an independently chosen key K− $← {0, 1}k. During the decryption
of the ciphertext vector C for evaluating the relation R, the KEM ciphertext C∗1 is always decapsulated as K− (without even
runningKEM.Dec). We claim:
Pr
[
Gb0 → 1
]
≈ Pr
[
Gb1 → 1
]
(1)
for b = 0, 1 (denoting by X ≈ Y that |X − Y | is negligible in k). To see this (for fixed b), construct an adversary A on the
PNM-CCA1 security of KEM, so that A = (A1,A2,A3) simulates the setting of game Gb0 resp. Gb1 for an internal simulation
of F . As a public key,A1 relays its own public key (forKEM) to F1, and oracle queries from F1 are answered usingA1’s own
oracle. The key point is that A2 presents to F2 a challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 ) that is built from A2’s own challenge
(K+, C+) as C∗1 ← C+ and C∗2 $← DEM.Enc(K+,m∗1).
Once F2 outputs a ciphertext vector C along with a relation R, A2 translates this into a ciphertext vector C′ for its own
PNM-CCA1 setting and relays R along with K+ as state information to A3. Specifically, C′ contains all KEM ciphertexts of C
which are not equal to the challenge KEM ciphertext C+. Finally, A3, on input (K+, R,K′), where K′ is the decapsulation of
C′, outputs R(m∗b ,M). Here,M is generated by decapsulating Cwith the keys in K′ and using K+ as the decapsulation of C+.
Now if A itself is run in Expkem-pnm-cca1-dKEM,A , its output is that of G
b
1−d when run with F . Since KEM is PNM-CCA1 secure,
(1) follows.
Next we simulate Gb1 (with adversary F) inside a NM-OT adversary B onDEM. Here, B chooses a PKEKEM,DEM keypair
on its own for the experiment and answers all oracle queries from F using this secret key. B relays F ’s choice of message
space and then uses its own NM-OT challenge C× inF ’s challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 ) as C∗2 . Relation R and ciphertext
vector C fromF are translated as follows: if a ciphertext (Ci1, Ci2) ∈ C has Ci1 = C∗1 , it is decrypted using the prepared keypair
and hardcoded into R. But all Ci2 with C
i
1 = C∗1 are collected and output by B as its own ciphertext vector (as ciphertexts
encrypted by the same unknown key as C∗2 = C×).
Now the experiment Expdem-nm-atk-bDEM,B is simply a reformulation of G
b
1 (with adversary F). By the NM-OT security of
DEM, we thus have Pr
[
G01 → 1
]
≈ Pr
[
G11 → 1
]
, and hence, using (1), Pr
[
G00 → 1
]
≈ Pr
[
G10 → 1
]
, which shows
PKEKEM,DEM secure.
The only difference in the CPA case is that F has no oracle access in the first phase; but then the reductions above work
fine with a KEM that is PNM-CPA secure and a DEM which is NM-OT secure. 
4. Insufficient conditions for secure hybrid encryption
4.1. Claims
Now we turn to negative results from Fig. 1. The following results are successively proved in Section 4.2
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Theorem 4.1 (IND-CCA1 KEM + IND-CCA2 DEM ⇒ NM-CPA PKE). Assume there exist a scheme KEM which is secure in the
sense of IND-CCA1 and a schemeDEMwhich is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2. Then there exist a schemeKEM′ which is secure in
the sense of IND-CCA1 and a schemeDEM′ which is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2, such that the hybrid schemePKEKEM′,DEM′
is not secure in the sense of NM-CPA.
Theorem 4.2 (NM-CPA KEM + IND-CCA2 DEM ⇒ IND-CCA1 PKE). Assume there exist a scheme KEM which is secure in the
sense of NM-CPA and a schemeDEMwhich is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2. Then there exist a schemeKEM′ which is secure in
the sense of NM-CPA and a schemeDEM′ which is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2, such that the hybrid scheme PKEKEM′,DEM′
is not secure in the sense of IND-CCA1.
Theorem 4.3 (∗ KEM + IND-CCA1 DEM ⇒ NM-CPA PKE). Assume there exists a scheme DEM which is secure in the sense of
IND-CCA1. Then there exists a schemeDEM′ which is also secure in the sense of IND-CCA1, such that for anyKEM (independently
of its security level), the hybrid scheme PKEKEM,DEM′ is not secure in the sense of NM-CPA.
Theorem 4.4 (∗ KEM + NM-CCA1 DEM ⇒ IND-CCA2 PKE). Assume there exists a schemeDEMwhich is secure in the sense of
NM-CCA1. Then there exists a schemeDEM′ which is also secure in the sense of NM-CCA1, such that for anyKEM (independently
of its security level), the hybrid scheme PKEKEM,DEM′ is not secure in the sense of IND-CCA2.
Theorem 4.5 (NM-CCA1 KEM + IND-CCA2 DEM ⇒ IND-CCA2 PKE). Assume there exist a scheme KEM which is secure in
the sense of NM-CCA1 and a scheme DEM which is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2. Then there exist a scheme KEM′ which
is secure in the sense of NM-CCA1 and a scheme DEM′ which is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2, such that the hybrid scheme
PKEKEM′,DEM′ is not secure in the sense of IND-CCA2.
4.2. Proof of Theorem 4.1: IND-CCA1 KEM + IND-CCA2 DEM ⇒ NM-CPA PKE.
Assumethereexists an IND-CCA1secure schemeKEM.WemodifyKEM intoa schemeKEM′ = (KEM’.Kg,KEM’.Enc,
KEM’.Dec) which is still secure in the sense of IND-CCA1. For that, we split the keys generated by KEM.Enc in two parts
of the same length k (we assume that the key-length of KEM.Dec is 2k), denoting this fact as K = K1||K2. Concretely, we
set KEM’.Kg = KEM.Kg and
Alg. KEM’.Enc(pk)
(K1||K2, C1) $← KEM.Enc(pk)
Return (K1||K2, C1||⊥)
Alg. KEM’.Dec(sk, C′1||C′2)
K1||K2 $← KEM.Dec(sk, C′1)
If C′2 ∈ {⊥, K2} then K = K1||K2 else K = ⊥
Return K
Note that KEM′ inherits the IND-CCA1 security of KEM: any IND-CCA1 adversary A′ on KEM′ can be reduced to an IND-
CCA1 adversary on KEM by straightforwardly translating the challenge ciphertext and the decryption queries in the first
phase to the KEM′ setting that A′ expects.
With respect to theDEMpart, assumenow that there exists an IND-CCA2 secure schemeDEM = (DEM.Kg,DEM.Enc,
DEM.Dec), with key-space {0, 1}k.WemodifyDEM into a newDEMDEM′ = (DEM’.Kg,DEM’.Enc,DEM’.Dec) (with
key-space {0, 1}2k so as to be compatible withKEM′) which is still secure in the sense of IND-CCA2. Again we split the keys
K = K1||K2 used byDEM in two parts of the same length
Alg. DEM’.Kg(1k)
K1
$← DEM.Kg(1k)
K2
$← {0, 1}k
Return K = K1||K2
Alg. DEM’.Enc(K,M)
Parse K as K1||K2
C′1
$← DEM.Enc(K1,M)
C′2 ← K2
Return C′ = C′1||C′2
Alg. DEM’.Dec(K, C′)
Parse C′ as C′1||C′2 and K as K1||K2
If C′2 = K2 thenM ← DEM.Dec(K1, C′1)
elseM ←⊥
ReturnM
Claim 4.6. IfDEM is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2, then so isDEM′.
Proof. We reduce an adversary B′ = (B′1, B′2) on the IND-CCA2 security of DEM′ to an adversary B = (B1, B2) on the
IND-CCA2 security ofDEM. The idea is thatB internally runsB and simply translates challenge ciphertext and oracle queries:
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Alg. BENC1,DEC11 (1k)
K2
$← {0, 1}k; St $← B′ENC′1,DEC′11 (1k)
Return St||K2
Alg. B2ENC2,DEC2(C∗, St||K2)
b
$← B′ENC′2,DEC′22 (C∗, St)
Return b
Here, oracle ENC′2(M) returns ENC2(M)||K2. Oracle DEC′2(sk, C′1||C′2) returns DEC2(sk, C′1) if C′2 = K2 and ⊥ otherwise.
(Similarly for ENC′2 and DEC′2.) Note that this implies that B never queries DEC′2 on its target ciphertext.
Now B′ gets identical views in the simulation inside B and in the IND-CCA2 experiment with DEM′. Hence
Advdem-ind-atkDEM′,B′ (k) = Advdem-ind-atkDEM,B (k) and thus,DEM′ inherits the IND-CCA2 security ofDEM. 
Note that DEM′ also inherits a possible ciphertext integrity property [4,18] from DEM. That is, if an adversary cannot
produce fresh ciphertexts for DEM that are valid (in the sense that they do not get rejected by the decryption algorithm),
then the same holds for DEM′. The idea is that an adversary producing a valid DEM′ ciphertext (C′1, C′2) (with C′2 = K2)
must already produce a validDEM ciphertext C′1.
Claim 4.7. PKEKEM′,DEM′ is not secure in the sense of NM-CPA.
Proof. We build a successful adversary F = (F1,F2) against PKEKEM′,DEM′ . In the first phase, F1 receives a public key
pk and chooses as M the uniform distribution in a set of two messages m0,m1. Then, in the second phase, F2 receives
a challenge ciphertext for the hybrid PKE scheme: C∗ = (C∗1||C∗2, C∗3||C∗4) where (K1||K2, C) $← KEM.Enc(pk), C∗1 = C,
C∗2 =⊥, C∗3 = DEM.Enc(K1,M∗) and C∗4 = K2, for some challenge messagem∗ ∈ {m0,m1}.
Now, the ciphertext C = (C∗1||C∗4, C∗3||C∗4) is also a valid ciphertext for PKEKEM′,DEM′ which encrypts the samemessage
m∗. Therefore, F2 can output (R, C), where R(m,m′) = 1 if and only if m = m′. In the experiment with b = 1, where
message m in the evaluation of the relation is the challenge message m∗, the relation holds with probability one (message
m′ is in both experimentsm′ = PKE.Dec(sk, C) = m∗); on the other hand, in the experiment with b = 0, where message
m in the evaluation of the relation is message taken uniformly (and independently from m∗) from the set {m0,m1}, the
relation only holds with probability 1/2. Therefore the adversary F is successful.
Note that the use of the identity relation in a non-malleability attack is explicitly disallowed in [14]; however, our attack
from above can be adapted to use a “bitwise complement” relation at the price of a more complicated KEM and DEM
modification. 
4.3. Proof of Theorem 4.2: NM-CPA KEM + IND-CCA2 DEM ⇒ IND-CCA1 PKE
Assume there exists an NM-CPA secure scheme KEM = (KEM.Kg,KEM.Enc,KEM.Dec). Once again, it will be
useful to assume that KEM has a key-space of {0, 1}2k. Also we assume that the secret keys sk of KEM are of the form
sk = sk1|| . . . ||skp(k) for ski ∈ {0, 1}k and p(k) a fixed polynomial. Both of these assumptions are without loss of generality.
WemodifyKEM into a KEMKEM′ = (KEM’.Kg,KEM’.Enc,KEM’.Dec)which is still secure in the sense of NM-CPA.
The modification is very similar to the one proposed in Section 3.6 of [3] for the case of PKE schemes
Alg. KEM’.Kg(1k)
(pk, sk)
$← KEM.Kg(1k)
v
$← {0, 1}k
pk′ $← pk; sk′ $← (sk, v)
Return (pk′, sk′)
Alg. KEM’.Enc(pk′)
(K, C)
$← KEM.Enc(pk′)
Define C′ = 0||C
Return (K, C′)
Alg. KEM’.Dec(sk′, C′)
Parse sk′ = (sk, v) and C′ = b||C
If b = 0 returnKEM.Dec(sk, C)
else if C = v||i for 1 ≤ i ≤ p(k) then
return 0k||ski else return 0k||v
Using the same techniques as in Section 3.6 of [3] for the case of PKE schemes,KEM′ can be proved to be secure in the sense
of NM-CPA, whereas it is obviously insecure in the sense of IND-CCA1.
With respect to theDEMpart, assumenow that there exists an IND-CCA2 secure schemeDEM = (DEM.Kg,DEM.Enc,
DEM.Dec) (with key-space {0, 1}2k, so that we can write K = K1||K2 for keys K1, K2 ∈ {0, 1}k). We modify DEM into a
DEMDEM′ = (DEM’.Kg,DEM’.Enc,DEM’.Dec) which is still secure in the sense of IND-CCA2.
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Alg. DEM’.Kg(1k)
K
$← DEM.Kg(1k)
Return K
Alg. DEM’.Enc(K,m)
Write K = K1||K2
If K1 = 0k then C = K⊕m
Else C
$← DEM.Enc(K,m)
Return C
Alg. DEM’.Dec(K, C)
Write K = K1||K2
If K1 = 0k thenm = K⊕C
Elsem ← DEM.Dec(K, C)
Returnm
NowDEM′ inheritsDEM’s IND-CCA2 security, since the only difference between the two schemes appears whenDEM.Kg
produces a 2k-bit key K such that the first k bits of K are all zero (which happens only with negligible probability). Except
for this negligible probability, the advantages of an adversary againstDEM and an adversary againstDEM′ are exactly the
same. For similar reasons,DEM′ enjoys ciphertext integrity [4,18] ifDEM does.
Claim 4.8. PKEKEM′,DEM′ is not secure in the sense of IND-CCA1.
Proof. AnadversaryF against the IND-CCA1propertyofPKEKEM′,DEM′ receives apublic keypk′ resulting from (pk′, sk′) ←
KEM.Kg′(1k). Recall that sk′ = (sk, v), where (pk′, sk′) ← KEM.Kg(1k) and we write sk = sk1|| . . . ||skp(k).
In the first phase, F can ask decryption queries to an oracle; in particular, it can first ask for the decryption of the hybrid
ciphertext (1||0||0, 02k). By definition of KEM′, the key encapsulated in C′ = 1||0||0 is K = K1||K2 = 0k||v; by definition
of DEM′, since K1 = 0k, we have that the decrypted message obtained from this query is m = K⊕02k = K = 0k||v.
Once F has obtained the secret value of v, it can ask for the decryption of the ciphertexts (1||v||i, 02k), obtaining as answers
the messages 0k||ski. Therefore, F is able to obtain the whole secret key sk′ of the hybrid encryption scheme, even before
receiving the challenge ciphertext. This means in particular that PKEKEM′,DEM′ is not IND-CCA1 secure. 
4.4. Proof of Theorem 4.3: ∗ KEM + IND-CCA1 DEM ⇒ NM-CPA PKE
For this, we can use the ideas in the proof of [3, Theorem 3.5]. Say there exists an IND-CCA1 secure DEM DEM =
(DEM.Kg,DEM.Enc,DEM.Dec). We modify DEM into a new DEM DEM′ = (DEM’.Kg,DEM’.Enc,DEM’.Dec)
which is still secure in the sense of IND-CCA1. The new DEM DEM′ is defined as follows. Here we denote by m the bit-
wise complement of the stringm, namely the string obtained by flipping each bit ofm
Alg. DEM’.Kg(1k)
K
$← DEM.Kg(1k)
Return K
Alg. DEM’.Enc(K,m)
C1
$← DEM.Enc(K,m)
C2
$← DEM.Enc(K,m)
Return C′ = C1||C2
Alg. DEM’.Dec(K, C′)
Parse C′ as C1||C2
m ← DEM.Dec(K, C1)
Return ⊥
The following was already proved in [3, Claim 3.10] for the PKE case. (The proof holds literally, apart from obvious syntactic
adaptations, in our case.)
Claim 4.9. IfDEM is secure in the sense of IND-CCA1, then so isDEM′.
However, the attack from [3, Claim 3.9] carries over to the hybrid setting.
Claim 4.10. For any scheme KEM, PKEKEM,DEM′ is not secure in the sense of NM-CPA.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary scheme KEM = (KEM.Kg,KEM.Enc,KEM.Dec). In effect, we can easily construct a suc-
cessful adversary F = (F1,F2) against the NM-CPA property of the hybrid scheme: F1 receives a public key pk, result-
ing from (pk, sk) ← KEM.Kg(1k); then it chooses the uniform distribution on a set {m0,m1} of two messages, and
receives a challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C1, C2||C3), where (K, C1) $← KEM.Enc(1k, pk), C2 = DEM.Enc(K,m∗) and
C3 = DEM.Enc(K,m∗), for some uniformmessagem∗ ∈ {m0,m1}. It is evident that C = (C1, C3||C2) is a valid encryption
of messagem∗ under the scheme PKEKEM,DEM′ .
The adversaryF2 can output (R, C), whereC = C contains only one ciphertext, and the relation is defined asR(m,m′) = 1
if and only if m′ = m. In the real experiment (with b = 1), where m = m∗ in the evaluation of R, the relation holds with
probability one (message m′ is in both experiments m′ = PKE.Dec(sk, C) = m∗). On the other hand, in the b = 0
experiment we have that R is evaluated on a uniform message m ∈ {m0,m1} (chosen independently from m∗), and in m∗,
so the relation holds only with probability 1/2. Therefore the adversary F = (F1,F2) is successful in breaking NM-CPA of
this hybrid scheme. 
4.5. Proof of Theorem 4.4: ∗ KEM + NM-CCA1 DEM ⇒ IND-CCA2 PKE
Assuming that there exists aNM-CCA1 secure schemeDEM = (DEM.Kg,DEM.Enc,DEM.Dec), wemodifyDEM into
a new DEMDEM′ = (DEM’.Kg,DEM’.Enc,DEM’.Dec)which is still secure in the sense of NM-CCA1. This modification
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is the same as the one proposed in Section 3.7 of [3] in order to prove that there exist (public key) encryption schemeswhich
are NM-CCA1 secure but not NM-CCA2. Let F = {Fk : k ≥ 1} be a family of pseudo-random functions (this is no extra
assumption): each Fk = {FK : K ∈ {0, 1}k} is a finite collection of particular functions FK : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k , indexed by a
key K . We denote as ε the empty string. Again we split the keys K = K1||K2 used by DEM in two parts of the same length.
The new schemeDEM′ is defined as follows:
Alg. DEM’.Kg(1k)
K1
$← DEM.Kg(1k)
K2
$← {0, 1}k
Return K = K1||K2
Alg. DEM’.Enc(K,m)
Parse K as K1||K2
C = DEM.Enc(K1,m)
Return C′ = 0||C||ε
Alg. DEM’.Dec(K, C′)
Write K = K1||K2 and C′ = b||C||z
If b = 0 and z = ε, returnDEM.Dec(K1, C)
Else if b = 1 and z = ε, return FK2(C)
Else if b = 1 and z = FK2(C),
returnDEM.Dec(K1, C)
Else return ⊥
The following has been proved as [3, Claim 3.15].
Claim 4.11. IfDEM is secure in the sense of NM-CCA1, then so isDEM′.
Again, DEM uses keys of length 2k, hence we need a KEM with key-space {0, 1}2k. (We stress again that this is without
loss of generality.)So for the rest of this proof, we assume that KEM is any KEM with key-space {0, 1}2k.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3, the attack from [3, Claim 3.14] onDEM can be transported to the hybrid setting.
Claim 4.12. For any scheme KEM, PKEKEM,DEM′ is not secure in the sense of IND-CCA2.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary KEM KEM = (KEM.Kg,KEM.Enc,KEM.Dec) and consider the hybrid public key encryp-
tion scheme PKEKEM,DEM′ . We are going to show that this hybrid scheme is not secure in the sense of IND-CCA2. An adver-
sary F against the IND-CCA2 property of PKEKEM,DEM′ receives a public key pk resulting from (pk, sk) ← KEM.Kg(1k);
after the first phase, it receives a challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C1, 0||C2||ε), where (K1, C1) $← KEM.Enc(1k, pk) and
C2 = DEM.Enc(K1,mb), for some message mb (with b = 0, 1 depending on the IND experiment) between two messages
m0,m1 chosenbyF . In the followingphase, theadversaryF hasaccess toadecryptionoracle for ciphertextsdifferent fromC∗.
In particular, it can first ask for the decryption of (C1, 1||C2||ε), obtaining the value of FK2(C). Then it can ask for the
decryption of (C1, 1||C2||FK2(C)), obtaining DEM.Dec(K1, C) = mb and thus breaking not only the IND security of the
hybrid scheme, but also its one-wayness. Note that none of these two submitted ciphertexts is equal to C∗, as required. 
4.6. Proof of Theorem 4.5: NM-CCA1 KEM + IND-CCA2 DEM ⇒ IND-CCA2 PKE
Assume there exists a NM-CCA1 secure scheme KEM = (KEM.Kg,KEM.Enc,KEM.Dec), where we again assume
that the key-space of KEM is {0, 1}2k. We start off by modifying KEM into KEM′ along the lines of the modification of the
DEM in the proof of Theorem 4.4. Namely, if F is a family of pseudo-random functions, we define:
Alg. KEM’.Kg(1k)
(pk, sk)
$← KEM.Kg(1k)
u
$← {0, 1}k
sk′ ← sk||u
Return (pk, sk′)
Alg. KEM’.Enc(pk)
(K, C) = KEM.Enc(pk′)
C′ ← 0||C||ε
Return (K ′, C′)
Alg. KEM’.Dec(sk′, C′)
Write sk′ = sk||u and C′ = b||C||z
If b = 0 and z = ε, returnKEM.Dec(sk, C)
else if b = 1 and z = ε, return 0k||Fu(C)
else if b = 1 and z = 0k||Fu(C) then
returnKEM.Dec(sk, C)
else return ⊥
Again, a trivial syntactic adaptation of [3, Claim 3.15] shows
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Claim 4.13. If KEM is secure in the sense of NM-CCA1, then so is KEM′.
Combined with the IND-CCA2 secure DEM DEM′ from the proof of Theorem 4.2, we get a hybrid encryption scheme
PKE = PKEKEM′,DEM′ . Now PKE is not IND-CCA2 secure. Namely, a CCA2 attack on KEM’ along the lines of the CCA2
attack onDEM’ in the proof of Theorem4.4 can be carried out “through” theDEMDEM′ just like in the proof of Theorem4.2.
We omit the details.
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